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The Americans with Disabilities Act and
Collective Bargaining Agreements:
Reasonable Accommodations or
Irreconcilable Conflicts?
BY MARY K. O'MELVENY*
INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),' which took
effect on July 26, 1992,2 promises to significantly enhance employment
opportunities for people with disabilities. The ADA has received broad
support from both individuals3 and orgamzations4 working to remove
barriers to the full employment of the disabled and includes many of the
statutory protections for disabled workers contained in the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. The ADA, however, is intended to reach more broadly than the
* Headquarters Counsel, Communication Workers of Amenca, AFL-CIO. Some of
the textual material in this paper is based upon earlier drafts prepared by the author for
a Report m progress to be issued by the President's Committee on Employment of People
with Disabilities ("PCEPD"). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1993
Mid-Winter Meeting of the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section, EEO Committee.
The author is a member of the Working Group on Seniority and Collective Bargaining
Rights, a subcommittee of PCEPD.
'Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(Supp. 1111991) (commonly known as the Americans with Disabilities Act) [hereinafter ADA].
2 Id. at § 12111(5) (Employers with twenty-five or more employees are covered by
the ADA as of July 26, 1992. Employers with fifteen to twenty-four employees have until
July 26, 1994, to comply with the ADA.).
3 Individuals who testified m support of the ADA include Sandra Parrmo,
Chanperson, National Council on the Handicapped and Justin W Dart; Jr., Chairperson,
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. See H.R.
REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 25-27 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 485].
4 Among those organizations expressing support for the ADA were the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations [hereinafter AFL-CIO] and
the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research. See UNrIE STATES
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPpoRTuNrry COMMISSION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANcE MANUAL ON
THE EMPLOYMENT PROVisiONS (Ihr 1) o THE AMERICANs WITH DISABILITIES Act,
RESOURCE DIRECTORY (1992) [hereinafter ADA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL].
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b) (1988). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits
recipients of federal fimding, 29 U.S.C. § 794, federal government agencies, 29 U.S.C.
§ 791, and federal contractors, 29 U.S.C. § 793, from discrminating against qualified
individuals with disabilities. Congress used 29 U.S.C. § 794 as its primary model for the
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Rehabilitation Act by providing a "clear and comprehensive national
mandate ' to eliminate discrinmnation against disabled workers and by setting
forth "clear, strong, consistent and enforceable standards"7 for equal
treatment. In order for these standards to be met, the federal government must
play a "central role' m the enforcement of the ADA?
Labor unions"0 have been among the most vocal supporters of the ADA
and the added benefits that the Act brings to their members. Unions recognize
that the sweeping benefits contained m the ADA are consistent with the
interests of all of the employees that they represent. Prior to the ADA's
enactment, unions often sought improved health and safety protections in the
workplace through the well-established collective bargaining process.
Traditionally, unions used prohibitions against discrimination contained m
their collective bargaining agreements and their contractual grievance
procedures to protect the rights of employees with disabilities. The ADA
provides an enhanced opportunity to continue these efforts by adding new
statutory requirements designed to compel reluctant employers to provide
equally safe and healthy working conditions for the disabled. As the number
of workers with disabilities continues to grow," these added requirements
have become increasingly significant.
ADA. ADA specifically provides that, at a inimun, its protections shall be as
substantial as those required by the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, the ADA does not preempt
any federal, state or local law which provides equal or greater rights for individuals with
disabilities than those established by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).
6 H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 22; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)
(explaining the purpose behind the ADA).
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
TId.
9 Id. § 12101(b)(3).
10 The AFL-CIO, for example, has been a major labor unon proponent of the ADA.
See AFL-CIO & GEORGE MEANY CENTER FOR LABOR STUDIES, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE
FOR TRAINING REPRESENTATIVES ON APPLICATION OF THE ADA 1 (1992).
" During Congressional hearings on the ADA, it was recognized that the number of
people with disabilities is steadily growing, and that many of these individuals suffer
frequent job discrmunation. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 30-34. The
statute recognizes that 43 million people suffer from disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
The ADA protects not only those who are actually disabled, but also those who are
'regarded" as having a disability, thus substantially increasing the number of individuals
protected. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The number of workplace injuries is also dramatically
mcreasing, causing many employees to join the ranks of the disabled. Each day 11,000
workers lose work time or must restrict their work activity due to serious injunes on the
job. Charles Noble, Keeping OSL4's Feet to the Fire, TECHNOLOGY REv. 43, 44 (Feb-
Mar. 1992). A recently released Public Health Service study documented job-related
mjures in 1988 affecting one of every 15 U.S. workers. PHS Releases Report on Job-
Related Injuries, 145 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D23 (DLR 1993), available in Westlaw,
BNA-DLR databases (citing conclusions set forth mNational Center for Health Statistics,
HEALTH CONDITIONS AMONG THE CURRENTY EMPLOYED, UNITED STATES 1988 (1993)).
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Unfortunately, neither the language of the ADA itself nor the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's guidance on the ADA's
enforcement explicitly acknowledges the existence, or the possible
importance, of the collective bargaining process as a way of maximizing
the effectiveness of the Act As a result, there has been a tendency on the
part of some labor organizations, disability rights lobbyists and employers
to assume that the interests of nondisabled and disabled union members
are in conflict. 2 Indeed, several areas of tension appear to exist between
the obligations mposed by the ADA and the union's role as a collective
bargaining representative.
Congress gave virtually no guidance concerning how potential
conflicts between the ADA and other labor relations statutes, such as the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 3 should be resolved. Further-
more, the regulations and technical assistance materials issued by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") since the ADA's
enactment have shed little light on the appropriate resolution of such
conflicts. 4 Following the passage of the ADA, the EEOC issued notice
of proposed rulemaking on the relationslup between the requirements of
Title I of the ADA and the NLRA. 5 In response, comments were
received from the labor, employer and disability communities. 6 When
the EEOC issued its first set of regulations and interpretive guidance on
the ADA, however, it deferred taking a position on this issue. In the
preamble to its final rule, the Commission stated:
The comments that we received reflected a wide variety of views. For
example, some commentators argued that it would always be an undue
12 Such assumptions are based upon a lack of understanding of the ADA or on a lack
of understanding of the historical efforts by organized labor to expand protections for
disabled workers, as discussed above. Commentators from the differing perspectives have
suggested varying means of resolving this debate. See, e.g., Eric H. Stahlhut, Playing the
Trump Card* May an Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate under the ADA by
Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation?, 9 THE LABOR LAWYEP 71, 93-96 (Winter
1993); Joanne J. Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, DET. C. L. REv. 925, 954-
71 (1991).
13 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988) [hereinafter NLRA];
see Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988) (encompassing and
amending the NLRA).
14 See ADA TECICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 4, at 111-16 (discussing
the possibility of union and employer conflict but suggesting only that the uinon allow
the employer to do whatever is required).
" 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1992).
161d.
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hardship for an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation that
conflicted with the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
Other commentators, however, argued that an accommodation's effect
on an agreement should not be considered when assessing undue
hardship.
Subsequently, the EEOC and the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") attempted to address these issues by
working to draft and adopt a substantive "Memorandum of Understand-
mg" that would provide the needed guidance. These efforts failed,
however, and the NLRB General Counsel issued its own Memorandum
to its field personnel on August 7, 1992.'" This Memorandum detailed
some of the potential conflicts between the ADA and the NLRA and
directed that any unfair labor practice charges raising ADA-related issues
should be referred to its Division of Advice for review." The EEOC,
while continuing to study the problem, has not yet issued any policy
statements or other documents that would assist in resolving the identified
areas of potential conflict."
The premise of this Article is that it is both possible and desirable to
reconcile the tensions which exist between the ADA and the National
Labor Relations Act, and its various state and local counterparts. Indeed,
this Article will argue that the best, most readily available vehicle for
doing so already exists--the labor-management relations dialogue known
as the collective bargaining process.
I. THE RELATIONSHip BETWEEN
THE ADA AND EXSTING LABOR LAWS
The existence of potential conflicts between state and federal labor
laws and the ADA stems from the failure of the drafters of the ADA to
give adequate recognition to the unique role that unions play m the
17 See Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of the NLRB on
Potential Conflicts Rised by Americans with Disabilities Act, 158 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
E-1 (DLR 1992), available in Westlaw, BNA-DLR databases [hereinater NLRB General
Counsel's Memorandum].
18 Id.
19 A draft of an enforcement guide was prepared by the EEOC staff at the end of
1992, however, and has been circulating as part of the EEOC's internal review process.
Letter from Evan Kemp, Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, to Justin W Dart, Jr., Chairman of the President's Committee on
Employment of People with Disabilities (Nov. 25, 1992) (on file with author).
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workplace. This role requires that each union take actions that advance
the interests of all members of the bargaining unit while, at the same
time, ensuring that the rights of individual employees are adequately
protected.
Much state and federal legislation governing labor-management
relations has recognized and defined this role of unions, as well as the
employer's corre-ponding duties and obligations.2" The principal federal
statute on collective bargaining is the NLRA,2i ' although other federal
legislation, such as the Railway Labor Acte and the Federal Labor
Management and Employee Relations Act,rs also regulates labor-
management relationships and the rights of represented employees.
Additionally, many states have enacted legislation patterned after the
NLRA in order to include state or local government workers whom the
NLRA does not cover.'
Tins Article will examine several ADA provisions which arguably
conflict with the statutory requirements of the NLRA and with parallel
state and local labor relations enactments. Although limited guidance
exists to resolve these potential points of conflict, it should be obvious
that Congress did not intend to silently overrule large segments of long-
standing and crucial labor legislation m its efforts to accommodate
disabled individuals in the workplace.
EEOC Regulations issued early in 1992 provide that one defense
against a charge of ADA-prohibited discrimination will be to assert that
the action was required by "another Federal law or regulation [that]
prohibits an action (including the provision of a particular reasonable
accommodation) that would otherwise be required." Since Congress
" See, e.g., MAss. GEM. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, §§ 1-10 (West 1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 111.01-111.19 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.01-.17 (West 1993).
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988) (encouraging the use of collective bargaining and the
designation of representatives).
" 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1988). "Employees shall have the right to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." Id. § 152.
2' 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988). "Each employee shall have the right to form, join,
or assist any labor organization, or to refrain without fear of penalty or reprisal
and each employee shall be protected m the exercise of such right." Id. § 7102.
'4 Some state employees are also covered by executive orders. Furthermore, many
county and local government employees are covered by local ordinances. See, e.g., KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 030(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1993) (Kentucky Fire Fighters
Collective Bargaining Act permitting fire fighters m cities with population over 300,000
to engage m collective bargaining and those m cities with lesser populations to petition
for collective bargaining authority).
" 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1992).
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was aware of the existence of statutes such as the NLRA when it enacted
the ADA, the NLRA should arguably be included in the "federal laws"
defense category.26 Such a "federal laws" defense would recognize those
limited situations where employers and union representatives will have to
violate either the NLRA or the ADA because it will be impossible to
comply with both.
Recognition of the NLRA's important protections in evaluating ADA
rights and obligations is particularly important because of the unique role
played by unions as the employees' agent on matters affecting terms and
conditions of employment. Tus role leads to a corresponding duty of fair
representation. Collective bargaining representatives owe a duty to each
member of the bargaining unit to "serve the interests of all members
without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise their discretion
with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."'27
This duty exists at all stages of the collective bargaining
process-negotiation, adminstration and enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements.28
' The Umon comments presented to the EEOC on tis topic specifically recommend-
ed that § 1630.15(e) ' make clear that an obligation to comply with, among other laws,
the national labor relations act, would also be a defense to a charge of discrimination
[under] the ADA. The national labor relations act [sic], of course, requires employers and
bargaining agents to negotiate over the terms and conditions of employment." See Report
of the Labor and Employment Law Section of the American Bar Association on the
Proposed EEOC Rules on the Amencans With Disabilities Act, April 12, 1991, pp. 70-71
[hereinafter Labor and Employment Law Section Report]. This position, m fact, has been
advanced by the NLRB General Counsel. NRLB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra
note 17, at *2 (explaining that actions required by other federal laws would be a defense
to an ADA challenge).
' Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (citations omitted).
2 See Electrical Workers (IBEW) v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) ("A umon must
represent fairly the interests of all bargaining-unit members during the negotiations,
administration, and enforcement of collective-bargaming agreements"); see also Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'lv. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1991) ("Indeed, we have repeatedly
noted that the Vaca v. Sipes standard applies to 'challenges leveled not only at a umon's
contract administration and enforcement efforts but at its negotiation activities as well."'
(quoting Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 743 (1988)); Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 568-69 (1976).
In Vaca "we accept[ed] the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore
a meritorious grievance or process it m a perfimctory faslion," and our
ruling that the union had not breached its duty of fair representation m not
pressing the employee's case to the last step of the grievance process stemmed
from our evaluation of the manner m wInch the umon had handled the
grievance m its earlier stages.
(quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191).
[Vol. 82
ADA AND UNIONS
In the context of the ADA, this judicially nposed obligation
means that a union may not arbitrarily pursue the rights of a disabled
member m a manner that ignores the interests of nondisabled members.
Likewise, the union may not discriminate against a member with a
disability merely because other members are antagonistic to that
individual. Presumably, if a union's actions are fair, impartial and taken
m good faith, relatively wide discretion will be given to its ADA-related
efforts? 0
The NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum asserts that the NLRB
plans to analyze employees' unfair labor practice charges that implicate
the ADA by using "traditional principles" governing the duty of fair
representation.' Any union faced with a member's demand for an
" Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). The Steele Court
held that the Railway Labor Act "expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the
bargaining representative of a craft or a class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the
power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile
discrimination against them." Id. at 202-03. Subsequent cases have defined the duty as
a federal right and have treated a breach of the duty as an unfair labor practice over
which federal courts have jurisdiction. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343 (1964)
("[Tjlhs action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and
is a case controlled by federal law. "'); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffinan, 345 U.S.
330, 337 (1953) ("That the authority of bargaining representatives, however, is not
absolute is recognized n Steele v. Louisville & N.R Co. in connection with
comparable provisions of the Railway Act."); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Engmemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944) ("IThe right asserted by Petitioner
which is derived from the duty imposed by the Railway Labor Act as a bargainm
representative, is a federal right The case is therefore one arising under a law
regulating commerce of which the federal courts are given jurisdiction. "); c Syres
v. Oil Workers It'l Union, Local No. 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (ruling that employees'
challenge of collective-bargaming agreement provisions concerning seniority thathad been
agreed to by union representatives was based upon breach of contract and did not involve
the NLRA or any federal law).
30 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 111 S. Ct. at 1130 ("[A] umon's actions are arbitrary
only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the umon's actions, the
umon's behavior is so far outside a 'wide range of reasonableness' as to be
irrational:). Thus, mere negligence is not sufficient to charge a union with breach of its
duty of fair representation. See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990) (stating that '!mere negligence, even n the
enforcement of a collective-bargaining agreement, would not state a claim for breach of
the duty of fair representation.").
31 NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *4. The NLRB has
issued two rulings on requests for advice in unfair labor practice charges involving a
union's opposition to a proposed accommodation under ADA since issuance of the
General Counsel's Memorandum. The first, Local 876, United Food and Commercial
Workers (The Kroger Company), Case 7-CB-9518 (June 23, 1993) (on file with the
1993-94]
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accommodation under the ADA that would impair the rights of other
members in the unit is placed in a difficult, though not an impossible,
position. The best way to "accommodate" the competing and conflicting
interests involved is to insure that full communication exists at all points in
the ADA dialogue process, so that the union can play a constructive role in
suggesting alternative accommodations while limiting adverse effects on the
interests of the other workers. Resolving ADA issues m ways that are in
harmony with collective bargaining rights and that result in solutions that will
have the support of all members of the collective bargaining unit enables all
employees to receive the maximum protection of both the ADA and the
NLRA collective bargaining process.
In order for a union to carry out its fair representation duties, the NLRA
ensures that the union will be able to elicit information from, and insist on
dialogue with, the employer whenever terms and conditions of employment
are at issue.32 Without these crucial communications, the union cannot fulfill
its obligations to the workers it represents, including those workers with
disabilities.
I. THE AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ADA
AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTES
Hiring and personnel practices which discriminate against qualified
individuals with mental or physical disabilities are unlawful.33 Employ-
author) involved a umon's refusal to agree to the transfer of an employee suffering from
a panic disorder condition because it would violate contractual seniority provisions. The
Board concluded that there was no evidence that the unon's action was motivated by
discrimination, or that it had taken a different position m the case of non-disabled
employees seeking transfers, or that it had acted arbitrarily. There was evidence that the
union had agreed to earlier accommodations proposals which would not have violated the
contract, but the employee had rejected those approaches. Therefore, the Board concluded
that "the Union had a reasonable basis to decide that subordinating [the disabled
employee's] interests to the interests of other unit members, as required by the contract
seniority, was preferable." Id. at 5.
The second ruling, Local 125, United Auto Workers (John Deere Co.), Case 18-CB-
3323, 1993 WL 321785 (N.L.R.B.G.C.) (July 29, 1993), also dismissed a charge alleging
that the Union's failure to pursue a grievance challenging a contractually negotiated
smoking policy. The Board found no evidence that the Union's action was arbitrary or
motivated by discrinination against the employee's asthma condition, relying upon
traditional precedent protecting conduct within a "wide range of reasonableness," Id at
*3 (citing Ford Motor Company v. Huffinan, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) and Airline Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991).
3' Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 302 (1978) (declaring that the duty
to bargain collectively includes a duty to provide relevant information needed by the
unon to enable it to negotiate); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
33 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also id. § 12102(2) (defining the term "disability").
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ers must make "reasonable" efforts to accommodate such disabled
workers so that they can perform the "essential functions" of a position
unless doing so vould constitute an "undue hardship."' Required
accommodations may involve changes in job structure, work procedures,
or workplace environment that will enable disabled employees to enjoy
the same work opportunities that are available to nondisabled employ-
ees.' While each potentially "reasonable" accommodation will vary
according to the employee's individual circumstances and the nature of
the work, virtually every proposed accommodation will effect some
change in the working conditions for the disabled employee and often for
other employees as well.
A. Proposed Accommodations Affecting Terms and Conditions of
Employment Within the Bargaining Unit
The NLRA imposes upon employers a duty to bargain with the union
over "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment."'i
This duty is the -crucial component of the collective bargaining relation-
ship. Collective bargaining assumes an ongoing, cooperative relationship
and is premised upon a good faith willingness to reach agreement on
employment matters.37 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires an employ-
er to notify the union of any proposed "material, substantial or signifi-
cant' changes in working conditions and to bargain with the union over
such proposals.s Failure to do so constitutes a refusal to bargain and a
- 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
31 Id. § 12111(9).
36 This language is set forth in § 8(d) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
Section 9(a) also delineates "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employmenf' as mandatory bargaining subjects. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958), the Court
concluded that § 8(d) and § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), were to be read together to
establish a mandatory bargaining obligation whenever wages, hours, or conditions of
employment were at issue. The Court also recognized an area of "pernnissive" bargaming
subjects, about which the parties were 'Tree to bargain or not bargain, and to agree or not
to agree." Wooster, 356 U.S. at 349.
37 [The NLRA] does not require that the parties agree; but it does require that
they negotiate in good faith with the iew of reaching an agreement ifpossible;
and mere discussion with the representatives of employees, with a fixed resolve
on the part of the employer not to enter into any agreement with them, even as
to matters as to which there is no disagreement, does not satisfy its provisions.
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 1940) (emphasis added).
"' NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *2 (citing Lamousse,
259 N.L.R.B. 37, 48-49 (1981)).
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violation of the NLRA, regardless of the employer's good faithY Whenever
proposed changes will "vitally affect' the terms and conditions of the
employee's employment within the bargaining unit, these changes must be
presented to the union for negotiation.4 Normally, the courts will defer to
the judgment of the National Labor Relations Board m determning if a
statutory duty to bargain exists' Bargaining history and current industrial
practices are among the areas scrutinized m determining this duty.42
When a statutory duty to bargain exists, an employer cannot make any
changes in the terms and conditions of employment that would constitute
labor contract "modifications" without the consent of the union.' Failure to
obtain the union's consent to such changes violates section 8(d) of the
NLRA. 4 The NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum soundly reaffirms the
employer's duty to bargain with the union when proposing ADA accommoda-
tions that would effect any significant change in working conditions:
I]f an employerunilaterallyimplements a"reasonable accommodation" for
a disabled employee or otherwise alters its employment practices so as to
change wages, hours or other working conditions, its action may give rise
to a Section 8(a)(5) charge.45
Thus, any "change that is inconsistent with an established employment
practice such as a seniority system, defined job classifications or a disability
3' See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). "A refusal to negotiate rnfact as
to any subject which is within § 8(d), and about which the union seeks to negotiate,
violates § 8(a)(5) though the employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union
upon an over-all collective agreement and earnestly and in all good faith bargains to that
and." Id.
40 See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971) (affirming the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the NLRB's
holding that changes n an employer's unilateral modification of retired employees'
retirement benefits, which are embraced by the bargaining obligation, constitutes an unfair
labor practice).
41 See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 501 (1979) ("[Als for the argument
that rn-plant food prices and services are too trivial to qualify as mandatory subjects, the
Board has a contrary view, and we have no basis for rejecting it").
42 Id. at 499-500 (1979).
4i Katz, 369 U.S. at 743; Allied Chem., 404 U.S. at 179.
' NLRB General Counsel's Memorandun, supra note 17, at *1 ("[N]either party may
alter terms and conditions in the agreement without the consent of the other party.
Moreover, section 8(d) specifically authorizes parties to .refuse to 'discuss or agree to
any modification' during the term of the contract.").
45 Id.
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plan would more likely be a change m Section 8(d) terms and conditions"
of employment."
There are a few accommodations which are not generally thought to
constitute a substantial change in working conditions. These "non-
substantiar' changes involve an employer's expenditure of funds to make
minor additions to, or alterations of, work space or equipment in order to
enable the disabled individual to perform the essential functions of the
position.'7 Specific examples provided by the NLRB General Counsel
include posting notices in braille and putting a desk on blocks.
Although such purely physical, individual accommodations may have
little to no effect upon the rights of the other workers or upon general
working conditions within the bargaining unit, they do affect the terms
and conditions of employment of the worker with a disability. Thus, the
union should still be included in discussions about such proposed
accommodations in order to ensure that the employee's rights are
protected and to reduce the chance for conflict. Such ongoing dialogue
best serves the purposes of both the NLRA and the ADA.
Moreover, individualized negotiations between the employer and an
individual employee over even minor changes that involve a mandatory
bargaining subject require negotiation with the union and are precluded
by section 9(a) of the NLRA. Thus, even if the proposed accommoda-
tion does not affect other members' interests, the union should be allowed
the opportunity to participate in the discussion in order to reduce any
possible conflicts which may otherwise arise.50 In particular, participa-
4 Id. at *2.
47Id.
48 Aunilateral ' reasonable accommodation' wouldviolate Section 8(a)(5) only
ifit affects a "material, substantial or significant" change m workmg conditions.
Accommodations such as putting a desk on blocks, providing a ramp, adding
braille signage or providing an interpreter, which allow disabled employees to
perform the same job m a fashion different than other employees, generally
would not be changes in terns and conditions of employment. In that case an
employer would have no duty to bargain over the implementation of such
accommodations.
Id.
9 Id. at *3 (An employer and employee are authorized to adjust grievances "but only
'as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaming
contract [and] the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present
to such adjustment."' (quoting § 9(a) of the NLRA).
5' The benefits of this cautious approach are evidenced when considering the pre-
employment selection process. The ADA, of course, protects applicants for employment
as well as existing employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. III 1991). With the exception
of the hiring hall arena, where the pool of prospective employees are already m the umon,
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tion by the union may help to ensure that the accommodation is adequate
while not placing an undue burden on other workers.
B. "Direct Dealing" Between the Employer and the Disabled Employee
The EEOC Regulations interpreting the ADA describe the accommo-
dations process as an ongoing "interactive" dialogue between the
employer and a disabled worker that is aimed at developing alternative
ways ("reasonable accommodations") for that employee to perform the
essential functions of a particular job without causing undue hardship for
the employer." In a unionized workplace, such a worker-employer
dialogue is not permitted unless the collective bargaining representative
has declined the opportunity to participate in the process. The rationale
is simple-if an employer were free to make "special deals" with
individual employees, the collective bargaining process would quickly be
undermined.
Direct dealings between an employer and a represented employee are
subject to both the NLRA and the applicable collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, an employer who deals directly with a represented
employee about terms and conditions of employment violates sections
8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the NLRA.52 Moreover, an employer cannot reach
an agreement with an individual employee that would result in a violation
of the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement. There is no
reason to treat the ADA's passage as requiring a different rule, and there
are many reasons not to do so. 3 Thus, the employer needs to deal with
an employer's duty to bargain with the union over terms and conditions of employment
is far more limited when would-be employees are involved. However, if the selection
process includes a proposed accommodation which would "impact on members of the
bargaining unit," failure to bargain with the union about it may lead to a § 8(a)(5)
violation. See zd. at *4 n.5.
" EEOC regulations encourage the employer to "initiate an informal, interactive
process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This
process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(c)(3) (1992).
57 NLRB General Counsel's Memorandibn, supra note 17, at *3; see, e.g., Medo
Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944) (agreeing with the NLRB that
Medo Photo violated the essential principles of collective bargaining and engaged m
unfair labor practices by negotiating directly with the employees and disregarding the
bargaining representative); Standard Fittings Co. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 1311, 1319 (5th Cir.
1988) (Standard Fittings has committed unfair labor practices in refusing to bargain with
the union and in appealing directly to its workers.").
' An individual employee negotiating on her own may not possess the familiarity
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the employee through hIs union when searching for a reasonable
accommodation that might impact on the terms and the conditions of
employment Otherwise, any "dialogue" about matters covered by the
ADA that excludes the employee's collective bargaining representative
will run afoul of the NLRA.' The NLRB General Counsel's Memoran-
dum acknowledges the importance of union involvement: "[A]n employer
that arranges a reasonable accommodation with an employee which would
change working conditions without negotiating with the affected union
may be liable for 'direct dealing' with the employee" in violation of the
NLRA&
5
Involving the union in the accommodations discussion can significant-
ly increase the likelihood that the selected accommodation will be the
most reasonable under the circumstances. Union involvement neither
prevents nor discourages the employee from active participation in the
dialogue. Indeed, the employee seeking an accommodation should be
involved as well. However, the assistance and involvement of a collective
bargaining agent empowered to act on the employee's behalf will likely
increase the significance of the accommodations request in the eyes of the
employer and place additional pressure on the employer to find the most
reasonable solution.' To facilitate the union's participation in the
accommodations discussion, unions and employers might establish joint
task forces or committees that focus specifically on ADA issues and
routinely discuss facts and likely solutions whenever an employee
requests an accommodation. Such committees would quickly develop
with the bargaining unit or the knowledge of past grievances or settlements which might
apply to the accommodation being requested. The individual does not have the same
authority to request relevant infoimation from the employer to aid in reaching agreement
and lacks the standing to seek NLRB enforcement of such requests. NLRB General
Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *3.
There is a substantial body of precedent establishing that an employer cannot
exclude the union from conferences regarding employee grievances and complaints. See,
e.g., Carbonex Coal Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1313 (1982) (holding that changing hours
pursuant to an employee request without giving the umon notice or an mvitation to
bargain violates the NLRA).
" Id. at *3; cf NLRB v. American Mfg. Co. of Tex., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965)
(affinng the NLRB's ruling that the employer violated the NLRA by faiing to bargain
and by making unilateral changes.).
ms As noted in the General Counsel's Memorandum and the EEOC Regulations, the
ADA does not require selection of the "best" accommodation, only one which is
reasonable. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *5 n.17; see also
29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1992) (an employer must make a reasonable accommodation unless
the accommodation creates undue hardship); 29 C.F.R. § 1630(o) (1992) (defining the
term "reasonable accomodation' and providing examples).
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"expertise" in evaluating and recommending particular accommodations
and in searching for the solution that would have the least disruptive
impact on other contractual rights or existing workplace practices.
Furthermore, the establishment of such committees would demonstrate to
all workers a firm comnntment by management and the union to make
the needs of workers with disabilities a paramount concern in the
workplace.
C. Proposed Accommodations Adversely Affecting the Rights of Other
Bargaining Unit Members
The most difficult conflict between obligations and rights established
by the ADA and the NLRA will occur where a proposed accommodation
has consequences for the rights of the other bargaining unit members.
Proposed accommodations which may affect rights guaranteed by an
existing collective bargaining agreement can take several forms.' There
is no question that the NLRA requires that such accommodations be the
subject of discussions with the umon.'s If the rights of the other bargain-
ing-unit employees will be adversely affected, the union cannot agree to
such a proposal without violating its duty of fair representation to those
workers under the NLRA.
1. The Role of Semority
Traditional collective bargaining agreements provide that seniority
rights may determine, or play a significant role in determining, an
employee's eligibility for particular jobs, assignments, schedules, transfers
and promotions. Any proposal to accommodate a disabled employee by
providing a job or benefit that would normally go to the most senior
employee will likely infringe upon rights guaranteed by the collective
bargaining contract to another member of the bargaining unit.
" Present EEOC Regulations state that reasonable accommodations under the ADA
may include, but are not limited to, 'job restructurng, part-time or modified work
schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifications of equipment
or devices; appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials,
or policies; the provision of qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 29 C.F.R. §°1630.3(o)(2)(ii).
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) ("For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. ").
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Semority rights are some of the most historically significant rights
enjoyed by umon-represented employees because they often guarantee job
security. Seniority rights provide a crucial protection in the face of
"downsizing" or plant closings by ensuring that an employee is protected
against layoffs or is permitted to transfer to another position or location
rather than face unemployment. In addition, seniority rights offer a
neutral, predictable vehicle for making employment decisions when
competing needs or interests are involved. A seniority system provides all
employees, including employees with disabilities, with important
protections from management's favoritism, bias or arbitrariness on matters
such as promotions, assignments, or other opportunities. Because seniority
protections play such a central role, accommodations that threaten or
impair seniority rights could disrupt the entire collective bargaining
relationship. Additionally, pitting worker against worker fails to promote
the goals of the ADA or serve the needs of the employees that the ADA
was intended to protect.
2. Areas of Friction
The most likely areas of conflict between ADA compliance obliga-
tions and the rights established by the collective bargaining process
concern the following ADA-endorsed accommodations. First, the
employer could assign the disabled worker to a "vacant" position to
which more senior employees would have bidding rights or to which
employees on layoff status would have recall rights. 9 Second, the
employer could create a "new" or "restructured" position without
bargaining with the union about duties, performance standards, benefits,
or similar matters.' Third, the employer could offer the disabled worker
" This accommodation is discussed m the House Report on the ADA, which notes
that an employer can accommodate a disabled employee through reassignment to a vacant
position but need not "bump" another employee from the job to create a vacancy. H.R.
REP. No. 485, pt. 1, supra note 3, at 63.
' Job restructuring was discussed extensively by Congress as a means of providing
a reasonable accommodation. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1989)
(Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources) (defining job restructuring as
'"modifymg a job so that a person with a disability can perform the essential functions of
the position!); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 62 (means of job restructuring
include "eliminating nonessential elements of the job; redelegating asmgnments; changing
assignments with another employee; and redesigning procedures for task accomplish-
menf). Previously, employers had not been required to create 'new" positions as an
accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.701-709 (1992),
which applies to federal agencies and defines a "qualified handicapped person" as one
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a different position with, for example, more favorable hours, schedules,
or "light" duty assignments that would normally be open to bidding based
upon semority status."' Finally, the employer could reassign job duties
to other bargaming-unit employees in a way that would increase their
workload or otherwise effect a substantial change in their working
conditions.'
In addressing potential conflicts between proposed accommodations
and existing collective bargaining agreement provisions under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the courts generally ruled that modification
of contract provisions was not required if the provisions were the result
of a bona fide semority system.63 It is unclear, however, whether the
ADA contemplates similar deference, particularly since the ADA provides
as examples of accommodations types of accommodations governed by
traditional seniority criteria.'
who can, with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of
the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f). Thus, this area of the debate will focus on when a
restructured job becomes a "new" position.
61 An employer is not required to promote an employee into a vacant position. See
S. REP. No. 116, SUpra note 60, at 31-32 ("[B]umpmg another employee out of a position
to create a vacancy is not required."); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 63.
'2 See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 62 (discussing various approaches
to job modification, including eliminating nonessential assignments, redelegating tasks,
exchanging assignments with other employees and redesigng job procedures); see also
Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (D. Md. 1985) (holding that the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 does not require job reassignment). An argument that the ADA does not
require job reassignment will not succeed because the statute specifically suggests
reassignment as an example of a reasonable accommodation.
' These decisions involved proposed assignments to light duty jobs or other positions
that the collective bargaining agreement required to be given to employees with more
semority. See, e.g., Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that a light
duty assignment would conflict with bona fide semority provision reserving jobs for
employees with five years of semority); Daubert v. United States Postal Service, 733 F.2d
1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that an employee who did not qualify under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act could be discharged pursuant to the terms of a collective bargamm
agreement); Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 (6th Cir.
1985) (job restructuring); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789-80 (1st Cir. 1989) (reassign-
ment to vacant position).
6 Congress used the term "undue hardship," taken from the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1988), to define a defense to the ADA'sreasonable accommodation duty.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The concept of "undue hardshnp" in section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act has been given a significantly broader interpretation than, for example,
its use in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), to describe a "de minimis" defense as
failure to make an accommodation on religious grounds. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that an employer was not required to
accommodate a Jewish employee by giving him Saturday off, because it was more than
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Although the House and Senate committee reports suggest that the
terms of collective bargaining agreements are "relevant" to the determna-
tion of whether an accommodation is "reasonable,"'65 Congress did not
address this issue directly. Instead, the reports suggest that employers and
unions agree to the ADA "override" language, which would vest the
employer with the discretion to "take all actions necessary" to comply
with the ADA.'s This sinplistic proposal, however, would be a poor and
problem-ridden substitute for an ongoing dialogue between all of the
parties affected by an ADA accommodation request.
D. The Duty to Provide Information versus the ADA's "Confidentiality"
Provisions
The ADA has various confidentiality provisions that could create
potential conflicts with the rights guaranteed by the NLRA. For example,
as the bargaining representative, a union is entitled to all "relevanf'
information that impacts on its bargaining duties. ' Such information is
deemed to be an essential part of the collective bargaining process.s
The ADA, however, prohibits an employer from releasing medical
information concerning an employee's disability to anyone outside a very
a "de inimi cost"). Congress specifically stated that "undue hardship in the ADA is
intended to convey a significant, as opposed to a de innmis or insignificant obligation
on the part of employers." H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 3, at 40.
' See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 63.
66Id.
67Failure to funish such information to the umon is an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1947) ("It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (5) to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of hIs employees "). See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149, 153 (1956) (stating that employers have an obligation to furnsh relevant information
to a union during contract negotiations); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436
(1967) (noting obligation to furmish information extends past contract negotiations to all
"labor-management relations during the term of an agreement').
m See NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955) (noting unions cannot represent employees effectively
without information that is "necessary to the proper discharge of the duties of the
bargaming agen!). If the employer's refusal to provide information prevents the union
from being able to represent its members, the employer is preventing the operation of the
collective bargainmg process. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36
(1967) (holding that an employer has a general obligation to provide relevant information
that is needed by a bargaining representative). But see Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440
U.S. 301, 317-20 (1979) (stating that a umon's request for relevant information does not
always predominate over other legitimate interests).
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limited "need to know" group.' Such information must be maintained
in segregated files.7" A literal interpretation of these provisions will not
allow a umon to effectively carry out its function of processing grie-
vances on behalf of represented employees, including the disabled worker.
Absent such information, the umon might be unable to determine
whether, or how, a proposed accommodation might affect other employ-
ees m the unit, or whether an employer's refusal to provide an accommo-
dation was based on justified, ADA criteria. This information will clearly
be important if the union intends to assert that a failure to accommodate
is a violation of a contractual nondiscrimination clause.
An employer's refusal to provide the information to the union
hampers the union's ability to pursue the grievance process and arguably
violates the NLRA. In considering tis issue, the NLRB General Counsel
concluded that the NLRB would balance a union's request for "relevant"
information against an employer's "legitimate claim" of confidentiality."
The NLRB "will direct the parties to bargain over means to accommodate
both interests. 72
Absent the ADA's restriction on the release of medical or other
disability-related information, several factors would operate to determine
the balance between the competing demands of statutory entitlement and
privacy rights: (1) an employee may affirmatively "waive" her privacy
rights and consent to the release of confidential data; (2) such a waiver
may be implied whenever an employee has placed her medical condition
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (Stpp. 11 1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (1992).
7 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14.
n NLRB General Counsel's Memorandmt, supra note 17, at *3.
r Id. The Board already engages m such balancing when considering unfair labor
practice charges involving information requests that allegedly involve confidential matters.
See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-20 (1979) (holding that a company
does not always have to disclose relevant, requested information when bargaining m good
faith with a union). The burden is on the employer to demonstrate that specific harm will
result from disclosure of otherwise relevant records. An employer may not simply refuse
to disclose records because it prefers to keep them confidential, or because it sets forth
a blanket assertion of privilege. See WCC Radio, Inc. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 511, 515 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) (enforcing 282 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1987) and holding
that a court must "weigh the competing interests of the employer and imon m the
requested information"); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Umon No. 6-418 v. NLRB
(Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.), 711 F.2d 348, 358-63 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that an
appropriate balance must be struck between the interests of employers and umons);
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 474-76 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that
a union can waive its right to relevant information during settlement negotiations and thus
be estopped from prosecuting an alleged violation when the company refuses a later
request).
[Vol 82
ADA AND UNIONS
at issue m challenging some action or omission by the employer; and (3)
the union representative may agree to limited confidentiality restrictions
on the use of the information released m order to assure that it can pursue
its statutory obligations, while at the same tune avoiding unnecessary
disclosure.'
The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual has specifically noted that
the ADA's limitations on the release of confidential information do not
apply m circumstances where "other" federal laws "require disclosure of
relevant medical information."74 Including the NLRA and related labor
statutes within this category of "other" federal laws would result in the
harmonious interpretation of both statutory schemes. By allowing union
representatives to actively participate m the accommodation decision, the
employer and the disabled worker will receive the advantage of additional
input and guidance in selecting the most reasonable accommodation. This
participation should also significantly reduce the number of grievances,
legal disputes and unfair labor practice charges.
E. Detenninations of "Essential" Job Functions
Collective bargaining agreements sometimes contain negotiated job
descriptions. To be "qualified" under the ADA, however, an employee
with a disability need only be able to perform the "essential functions"
of a position, not every function.75 The requisite reasonable accommoda-
tion which must be provided is only directed to the key functions, as
defined in the ADA, not to the ancillary duties of the position, regardless
of whether or not the job has traditionally involved additional duties.76
7 The NLRB has held, for example, that medical information must be released when
it is to be used m processing grievances. See Howard Umv., 290 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1988);
LaGuardia Hosp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1455 (1982). The Board has also upheld the release of
redacted files and files that have been the subject of a specific employee waiver of any
privacy interests. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 368, 378 (1980).
74 ADA TEcHiAc ASSISTANcE MANuAL, supra note 4, § 6.5, at VI-12. EEOC
Regulations provide that confidential medical information may not be used for any
purpose "inconsistent" with the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(2) (1992). Several unions
submitted comments on the EEOC'sproposed Regulations and specifically recommended
the addition of specific language recognazng the right of collective bargaining
representatives to gain access to such data "where it is necessary for purposes of
representing members of the collective bargaining unit, including any disabled employee
hired by the employer." Labor and Employment Law Section Report, supra note 26, at
66-67.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), (n).
Essential functions are 'Tundamental job duties," excluding "the magmnal functions
of the position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).
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Congress cautioned that the terms of applicable collective bargaining
agreements may be "relevant" to the determination of a job's "essential
functions." Thus, any process to change job descriptions contained in
collective bargaining agreements or job functions traditionally subject to
negotiations between the union and the employer must result from
discussion and agreement between the union and employer.
Presumably, if an employer planned to evaluate or reassess its
collectively bargained job descriptions in order to determine "essential
functions" for purposes of ADA compliance, the new evaluation would
not be binding on the umon unless the union agreed to any change.78
Moreover, to the extent that negotiated job descriptions have been used
to establish wages, benefits, or other terms and conditions of employment,
potential difficulties arise in accounting for duties or responsibilities that
have been added to the load of the nondisabled workers in order to
accommodate the disabled employee.79 As noted earlier, any significant
alteration of such duties would constitute a change in employment terms
and conditions, which must be bargained for with the union.
I. THE "UNDUE HARDsHP" DEFENSE
An employer is not required to accommodate an employee if doing
so would create an "undue hardship."" An undue hardship is defined as
"an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" when considered in
light of its overall cost, the financial resources of the employer, and the
nature of the business.81 Citing House and Senate reports, EEOC
Regulations define an undue hardship as any action that would be
71 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 565, 567 (stating that an employer's written job description, prepared prior
to advertising or interviewing for the job, is evidence of the essential functions of the
job). The EEOC Regulations contain the same suggestion-that the job description be
evidence of the essential functions. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(v) (1992). Congress rejected
a proposed amendment that would have created a presumption in favor of the employer's
determination of essential job fnctions. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 3, at 33.
m The NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 19, at *3 cites an
employer's change in "defined job classifications" as an example of a change which must
be the subject of bargaining under Section 8(d) of the NLRA.
" Problems may also arise if an evaluation is conducted by interviewing individual
employees without informing the union of the discussion, particularly if the employer
plans to use the results of the survey to change terms and conditions of employment. See,
e.g., Marriott Corp., Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurant Div., 264 N.L.R.B. 432 (1982).
80 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A), (B) (Supp. 111 1991).
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"unduly costly, extensive, substantial or disruptive or that would
fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business."' The
burden of proof clearly lies with the employer to show undue hardship.
Arguably, an undue hardship exists when the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement clash with a proposed accommodation.
Congress explicitly recognized that collectively bargained rights may help
m determining whether an accommodation is reasonable or poses an
"undue hardship." Thus, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources Report on the ADA states:
The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant in determin-
ing whether a given accommodation is reasonable. For example, if a
collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with
a given amount of semority, it may be considered as a factor in
determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an
employee with a disability without semority to that job."
Additionally, EEOC Regulations recognize that "an employer could
demonstrate that a particular accommodation would be unduly disruptive
of its other employees or the functions of its business [and that] [t]he
terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant to this
determnation."' The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual, for exam-
ple, gives an illustrative scenario involving a worker with a deteriorated
spinal disc condition who seeks reassignment to a vacant clerical job. "If
the collective bargaining agreement has specific seiority lists and
requirements governing each craft, it might be an undue hardship to
reassign this person if others had seniority for the clerk's job. ' This
illustration continues with the recommendation that "the employer should
2 29 C.F.R. app. § 163 0.2(p). Obviously, such matters may be substantially
interrelated.
' S. REP. No. 116, supra note 60, at 32.
,See id., see also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt 1, supra note 3, at 63 (containing identical
language, but adding that "the [collective bargaining] agreement would not be
determinative on the issue").
" 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d). Congress endorsed the "flexible approach" to cost
arguments discussed mNelson v. Thomburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), af'd,
732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. demed, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985) (comparing the cost of
the proposed accommodation m time of severe budget crisis with the "social cost" of
discrimination); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing the flexible
approach).
"ADA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 3.9, at 111-16.
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consult with the union and try to work out an acceptable accommoda-
tion."
7
Congress also noted that any terms of a collective bargaining
agreement that are "inconsistent" with the obligations of the ADA should
neither affect the employer's duty to comply with the ADA, nor be used
to accomplish what the ADA would otherwise prohibit the employer from
doing."8 The NLRA does not protect contract terms that violate the ADA
on their face.' Few collective bargaining agreements, however, contain
provisions that would directly discriminate against employees protected
by the ADA. Thus, the ADA-NLRA tension will likely arise where the
proposed accommodation conflicts with "neutral" contractual rights.
It is not likely that Congress intended to ignore or override long-
established, facially neutral worker protections, such as seniority rights,
by including the language concerning discriminatory contract provisions
in the ADA. Such a conclusion is at odds with Congress' explicit
recognition that such rights must be factored into the "undue hardship"
determnation.9' Neither seniority rights nor other collectively bargained
rights can fairly be said to be the "cause" of any act which violates the
ADA. At most, the existence of such rights requires that the parties return
to the "drawing board" to consider accommodations that will be less
disruptive of existing labor and employee relations.
An accommodation that alters or impairs semority-based decisions
such as shift assignments, transfers, or promotional progression can
potentially impact on every employee at a work site or in a job group.
While the ADA does not contain any specific protection for bona fide
Id. Tins suggestion is offered "since both the employer and the umon are covered
by the ADA'srequirements." Id. However, itis followed by the note that "employers may
find it helpful" to negotiate ADA ovemde provisions in collective bargaining agreements.
Id.
8 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 60, at 32. EEOC Regulations explain that "contractual
or other arrangement[s]," including collective bargaining agreements, may not be used to
subject a "qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrmmation' that the
ADA prohibits. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6(a) (1992).
s NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *3.
9o A party would have no right under the NLRA to insist on adherence to
contract terms that are, on their face, violative of the ADA. On the other hand,
if the contract provision relied on is neutral on its face, a party may argue that
it should be entitled to rely on its Section 8(d) right to refuse to discuss or
agree to a proposed accommodation, inconsistent with that provision, if an
adequate alternative arrangement existed that would not conflict with the
collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
91 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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seniority systems, the ADA also does not provide for any "affirmative
action" obligations on the employer, such as hiring preferences or goals.
An employer is not required to "prefer applicants [or employees] with
disabilities over other applicants [and employees] on the basis of
disability."'  Instead, the employer simply must ensure that a disabled
employee does not suffer job discrimination because of the disability.
Thus, to the extent that a proposed accommodation results m preferential
treatment for the disabled employee over the long-established rights of
other, nondisabled employees, such an accommodation poses an "undue
hardship" and is not required by the ADA.
Congress was clear that an employer could continue to establish job
and performance standards, impose discipline, and take any other
employment-related actions as long as the result of those actions did not
disadvantage the disabled worker because of her disability.93 Contractu-
ally and statutorily mandated collective bargaining rights should be
considered to be of equal importance. In the absence of any statutory
obligation to "prefer" disabled employees or applicants over other
employees, seniority rights can frequently be demonstrated to be directly
related to job qualifications. As noted by the EEOC in its Interpretive
Guidance to its implementing regulations: "[The regulations are] not
intended to limit the ability of covered entities to choose and maintain a
qualified workforce. Employers can continue to use job-related criteria to
select qualified employees, and can continue to hire employees who can
perform the essential functions of the job."'
Longevity is a common, legitimate qualification for a position and
may, at least, bear a significant relationship to an employee's ability to
perform a job. A proposed accommodation that will potentially place an
employee with a disability in a position normally held by the most senior
employees may, in fact, indicate that the employee is not "qualified" for
that job due to an insufficient level of skill or experience to perform it.
Even if semority were not deemed to be an "essential" or job-related
criterion, there is no doubt that reaching an accommodation with a
disabled employee by ignoring seniority rights will cause a deterioration
in co-worker relationships with possible, corresponding, adverse effects
on morale, productivity, and efficiency.95 There is no reason to risk such
n H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 56.
" Id. at 55-56.
9 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.4 ("Interpretative Guidance on Title I of the Americans
With Disabilities Act').
EEOC Regulations reject the defense of undue hardship where "disruption!' to
employees results from "fear or prejudice" rather than the result of the accommodation,
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results when it is possible, through use of the established collective
bargaining process, to negotiate an accommodation that will have the full
support of co-workers and will serve the needs of the disabled employee.
That the ADA is not an "affirmative action" statute in the traditional
sense?' is significant when evaluating the potential conflicts between
collective bargaining rights and the employer's accommodation duty.
While employers should certainly evaluate their workplaces and job
definitions with a view toward ADA compliance issues, no particular
actions need be taken m advance of the time that a disabled employee
makes known her need for a reasonable accommodation. For example,
there is no requirement that the employer "set aside" certain jobs or
groups of jobs for occupancy by workers with disabilities. In fact, such
an action night itself violate the ADA by resulting in the "classification!'
of jobs based upon disabilities or the "segregation' of disabled workers
into particular work areas or lines of progression.97
Reasonable accommodation, however, is an affirmative obligation
under the ADA. This obligation is situation-specific, though, in that the
accommodations should be made on an individual basis. Providing an
accommodation that is reasonable under the particular circumstances will
involve time, attention and probably the expenditure of funds, yet the
result of these efforts will not necessarily be applicable to any other
situation. This individualized process underscores the need to carefully
consider every aspect of the proposed accommodation, including its
impact on the rights of other workers in the facility. Such careful
consideration will ensure that the final decision achieves the purposes of
the ADA, including the avoidance of "undue hardship."
or where a'negative npacf' on co-worker morale is not related to the co-workers' ability
to perform their jobs. 29 C.F.L app. § 1630.15(d). See also ADA TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 3.9.5, at Ii-15 (stating that restructuring of ajob
which results in a "heavier worldoad" for co-workers may constitute an undue hardship,
but that objections based on "feel[ing] uncomfortable" around the worker with a disability
would not).
' Compare 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1988) (stating that contracts "shall contain a
provision requiring that the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative
action to employ and advance m employment qualified individuals with disabilities") with
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988) (containing no affirmative action requirement). See Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (holding that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not
require a state to guarantee the handicapped equal results under state Medicaid benefits).
' The ADA prohibits 'limiting, segregating or classifying a job applicant or
employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities, or status of such applicant or
employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(1).
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IV COLLECTiVE BARGANNG AGREEMENT LANGUAGE
The legislative history of the ADA suggests that Congress believed
that conflicts between ADA obligations and other statutory obligations,
such as those imposed by the NLRA, could be resolved snnply by adding
language to the contract granting the employer the right "to take all
actions necessary to comply with [the ADA]."98 Unfortunately, such an
ADA "override" proposal fails to offer a solution to the conflicts wich
have been discussed above. Such a proposal could significantly hinder the
collective bargaining process by exacerbating, rather than resolving,
tensions m the workplace.
The NLRB General Counsel discussed this issue in the context of
obligations that intervening law imposes on the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement and that the employer then asserts as a defense to
charges that the employer has changed the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. Noting that an employer "may argue that its
obligation to comply with the ADA privileges it to act unilaterally,""
the General Counsel emphasized the discretionary nature of ADA compli-
ance. °° "[W]here the change in law leaves the employer with some
discretion with regard to compliance," an employer would violate section
8(a)(5) "by unilaterally changing terms and conditions to bring itself into
compliance" with the law."' An exammation of the case-by-case nature
of the ADA's reasonable accommodation burden and the existence of the
"undue hardship" defense clearly demonstrates that "an employer has
sufficient discretion under the ADA to warrant requiring it to afford a
umon notice and an opportunity to bargain about a proposed accommoda-
tion.""° Each NLRB Region has been advised that, before submitting
any case raising an undue hardship defense to the Division for Advice,
-See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 61, at 32: "Conflicts between provisions of a
collective bargaming agreement and an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommo-
dations may be avoided by ensuring that agreements negotiated after [July 26, 1992]
contain a provision permitting the employer to take all actions necessary to comply with
this legislation"
"NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *2.
10 Id.
101 Id.
Il. at *2; The EEOC's Regulations also make clear the lhghly discretionary nature
of the accommodations process. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) ('Whether a particular
accommodation will impose an undue hardship for a particular employer is determined
on a case by case basis. Consequently, an accommodation that poses an undue hardshup
for one employer at a particular time may not pose an undue hardslp for another
employer, or even for the same employer at another time.").
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it should investigate whether each element of the defense is present.
That is, it should attempt to ascertain all parties' positions as to whether
the proposed accommodation was the only one that would be effective
m the circumstances and whether that accommodation posed no undue
hardship.
03
Most collective bargaining agreements already contain prohibitions
against discrimination, including specific references to "disability" as a
category of protection. Even if the contract is silent on this point, anti-
discrimination laws apply to employers and umons regardless of whether
reference is made to them m a particular contract. Thus, such language
is not required in order to impose an obligation on the employer to
comply with the ADA. A union which agrees to vest such power in the
employer through the addition of unilateral action language runs the risk
of "endorsing" that employer's actions, or failure to act, and potentially
could be seen as jointly liable for the employer's decisions.'"
In addition, such override language is contrary to the usual rules of
labor-management relations, which encourage ongoing discussion and
agreement by the parties on issues impacting the rights of employees, not
unilateral action by one party. Yet, the ADA places the burden of finding
a reasonable accommodation that does not pose an undue hardship only
on the employer, not on the umoi or on the two jointly. Still, unions
must be prepared to cooperate with the employer to help come up with
accommodations that satisfy the statutory requirements. Simply relying
upon override language is an abandonment of the entire process.
It is a regrettable fact that greater numbers of the workforce are
becoming disabled each year."s Collective bargaining agreement
protections such as seniority rights are thus more important than ever as
a potential vehicle for protecting tns expanding group of employees. In
addition, as greater numbers of employers are forced to reduce their
workforces, or shift their operations to non-umon contractors, semority
rights become more crucial in protecting existing union employees from
the loss of their jobs. An assumption that the ADA should "ovemde"
SNLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *2 n.16.
104 See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Lane R.R., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding union can
be held jointly liable for promotion system contained m collective bargaining agreement
which had a racially discrimiatory effect even though union had no responsibility for
promotional decisions). See Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 702 (1980).
'0s 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
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such rights contained in existing collective bargaining agreements could
significantly undercut important worker protections at a time when they
are increasingly necessary. Effectuating the purposes of the ADA should
involve all interested and knowledgeable parties. There is no sound
reason to reduce the input and problem-solving ability of one of the key
players through such override language.
V ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The ADA!' provides that alternative means of dispute resolution
should be utilized to resolve disputes arising under the Act "where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law."' 7 The statute lists
various Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") methods, including
mediation, conciliation, facilitation, fact-finding, mi-trials and settlement
negotiations.0 8 Elevating ADR as a statutorily endorsed alternative to
litigation undoubtedly reflects a growing Congressional concern over
expensive and lengthy court proceedings.' 9 Congressional encourage-
ment of such nonlitigation measures, however, should not be viewed
either as a requirement that such measures be used, or as a "green light"
for bypassing traditional grievance and arbitration procedures contained
in collective bargaining agreements.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 0 employers have increasingly sought agreements from
workers to arbitrate, rather than litigate, employment discrimination
claims. In workplaces governed by collective bargaining agreements,
grievance and arbitration clauses have traditionally paralleled litigation
remedies. ADR methods have not been held to be the exclusive forum for
redress of discrimination complaints, however, since the Supreme Court's
ruling nearly twenty years ago in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co."'
,6 42 U.S.C. § 12212.
1
07 Id.
10 Id.
"S For example, the author of the amendment which eventually became 42 U.S.C. §
12212 argued that 'rights and litigation are not one and the same. There are better ways
to achieve the goals of the ADA than litigation and we should encourage cooperation m
achieving those goals, not confrontation" 136 CONG. REC. H2431 (daily ed. May 17,
1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
"o 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (holding that a claim brought under the Age Discrimination
m Employment Act of 1967 can be subjected to compulsory arbitration).
1 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that federal civil rights plaintiffs could not be
precluded from pursuing Title VII claims even though those claims had previously been
arbitrated under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement).
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Congress was not mandatmg ADR as a means of resolving ADA
clamns. 2 Joint conferees agreed that ADR was "intended to supple-
ment, not supplant, the remedies provided by this Act.". Thus,
any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement, or in an employment
contract, does not prevent the complainant from seeking relief under
other enforcement provisions of this Act. The Committee believes that
the approach articulated by the Supreme Court mAlexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co."4 applies equally to the ADA and does not intend that the
inclusion of Section 513 be used to preclude rights and remedies that
would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities." 5
While Congress was preventing employers from making ADR the
exclusive remedy for ADA violations, it did not address what might
happen if an employer decided to bypass existing collective bargaining
agreement grievance mechanisms and directly resolve an accommodation
dispute with the employee. Such an effort would certainly run contrary
to sections 8(a)(1)," 6 8(a)(5)" 7 and 9(a)"' of the NLRA if it
permitted "direct dealing" with the represented worker on terms and
conditions of employment. Thus, it would be neither "appropriate" nor
"authorized by law" for ADR to supplant the grievance process available
to a worker under a collective bargaining agreement. Should an employer
decide to set up a "special" ADA claims resolution process, it must
obtain the umon's agreement and permit it to be a participant in that
process.
CONCLUSION
We need not assume that there cannot be a "reasonable accommoda-
tion" between the ADA and collectively bargained employment contracts.
" See Report of Conference Committee on ADA: Joint Explanatory Statements, 136
CONG. REC. H4582, H4606 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).
113 H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, sTpra note 3, at 76.
114 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
11 H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 3, at 76-77.
11 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (employer may not interfere with employee exercising rights
under the NLRA).
117 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (employer may not refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of employees).
.. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (umon representatives are exclusive representatives of all
employees).
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There is every reason to expect unions to support ADA-mandated
accommodations and its protections of their disabled members. The
reality of most labor settings is that workers try to help each other on the
job. Therefore, it is unlikely that unions will oppose the providing of full
opportunities for qualified disabled workers. Instead, they will most likely
cooperate fully in the effort to help such workers function effectively in
the job.
In fact, union demands for significant health and safety changes in the
workplace have often met resistance from employers reluctant to expend
funds in a shrinking economy.1 '9 The ADA provides an avenue for the
union to renew those demands on behalf of disabled individuals, while
actually improving the worksite conditions for all its members. Many
unions already have committees in place that are knowledgeable about
medical and other health problems affecting represented workers. 2 '
Thus, the unions are in a position to press the needs of disabled workers
and to maximize the benefit to all of their members, using the ADA to
give added support to these efforts.
Unions have also been involved in the process of developing
accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 since its passage
over twenty years ago. The negotiations and grievance processes have
been utilized to resolve issues for temporarily disabled workers in need
of "light duty" assignments or similar assistance in protecting their jobs.
In particular cases, union representatives might be willing to endorse, on
a non-precedential basis, specific contract modifications to protect or
enhance opportunities for a disabled individual. In other cases, alternative
means can be developed, such as the purchase of equipment to assist with
heavy lfling tasks, which achieve that result in a less burdensome
manner. Such problem-solving approaches will enhance the ADA's new
protections for disabled workers, not impede them."
"1 Statement of USW Wage Policy Committee's Bargaining Goals, 243 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) D-1 (DLR 1992), available in Westlaw, BNA-LB databases.
"2 Some umons have established separate entities which focus exclusively on
providing retraining and related assistance to workers with disabilities. One example of
this approach is 'IAM Cares," sponsored by the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Worke ("IAM"), m conjunction with employers with whom IAM has a
collective bargaining relationship. Another variation on this theme is a joint effort
between 1AM and Boeing Aircraft known as the 1AM/Boeing Health and Safety Institute
which develops programs to bring occupationally injured and ill employees back to work.
1 Unons can also conduct ADA education and training programs or negotiate with
the employer for such employee training opportunities. The enhanced dialogue and
understanding which can result from such efforts will encourage flexibility when
individual accommodation issues arise.
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The fundamental principle of negotiation can enable employers to
effectively achieve ADA compliance in a workplace governed by a
collective bargaining agreement. Only through an ongomg dialogue
between all affected parties-the disabled individual, the union, and the
employer who has the burden to provide a reasonable accommoda-
tion-can the objectives of the ADA be effectively realized.
Thus, even if crafing an accommodation which impairs semority
rights of co-workers appears to be the quickest or cheapest solution, it is
also the most disruptive and least desirable. For this reason, both
Congress and the EEOC recognized that solutions such as "reassignment"
should only be measures of last resort. By looking carefully at the impact
wich a proposed accommodation will have on the entire work environ-
ment, as contemplated by the "undue hardship" defense built into the
ADA, the solution reached will most likely be accepted by everyone
affected.
The ADAs affirmative obligations require thought, time, and funds
to enhance opportunities for workers with disabilities. The most
"reasonable?' accommodation in each unique case will require an
evolutionary process which carefully evaluates, balances, and refines
proposals. Effective achievement of ADA objectives requires harmonizing
two statutory schemes, -both of which have the needs and benefits of
workers at their core. Potential conflicts can be "reasonably accommodat-
ed' if the time-tested collective bargaining process becomes part of the
day-to-day experience of the ADA's protections.
The collective bargaining process involves an ongoing dialogue and
commitment to problem solving. It is a natural vehicle for working
through existing tensions or potential conflicts m the employment arena,
or at least greatly lessening them. By including the union as an active
member of the "team" which makes the ADA decision, the potential for
conflict, including litigation, is reduced. Open and ongoing commumca-
tion and dialogue between the employer and the union on all issues
relating to ADA compliance will most effectively serve the goals of the
ADA.
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